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Abstrat We onsider a method for solving an antagonisti game with a
fuzzy payment matrix based on onverting fuzzy estimates of the onse-
quenes of possible strategies into an integral estimate in the form of an
equivalent fuzzy set with a triangular membership funtion. The method
does not impose restritions on the type of membership funtions for fuzzy
elements of the payment.
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1. Introdution
Antagonisti game as a model of a onit situation an be set by a triple
〈A = (ai : i = 1, I), B = (bj : j = 1, J), R(AB)〉,
where for A, B  set of players' strategies, R  payment matrix. The proess of
onstruting a payment matrix is one of the most important and omplex stages
of game-theoretial modeling of the deision-making situation. In the proess of
building a payment matrix there are a number of problems (Seagal, 2011):
1. These are the problems assoiated with the assessment of the representativeness
of sample data sets, on the basis of whih the values of the elements of the
payment matrix are determined;
2. Evaluation of the truth of the values obtained as a result of statistial observa-
tions;
3. The statistis reet the past state of the deision-making situation, hene
the question of their relevane to the present. Sue it to reall the non-
reproduibility of eonomi onditions in eonomi systems;
4. Expert assessments are fundamentally haraterized by unertainty, whih is not
reeted in the traditional proedures for the onstrution of payment matries;
5. Sets of players ' strategies have a omplex struture and it is almost impossible
to prove the ompleteness of these sets.
Classial game theory is based on the assumption that players have omplete
information about the set of possible strategies and the payment matrix, the ele-
ments of whih are point numbers, whih is essentially a simplied model of the real
situation. Obviously, beause of the above diulties, it is very diult to rely on
an aurate knowledge of the elements of the payment matrix, and most likely they
represent approximate estimates of the deision-making situation. In this regard,
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the situations when the elements of the payment matrix R(A,B) are fuzzy num-
bers are onsidered more and more often, for example, (Betor and Chandra, 2010;
Falomkina, 2009; Higast and Klir, 1983; Orlovsky, 1976; Zaihenko, 2010) and oth-
ers. In several studies (Chang, 1994; Sahoo, 2017; Stalin and Thiruheran, 2015;
Qui et al., 2018), in order to nd the best solution, the fuzzy elements of the pay-
ment matrix are replaed by their modal values, thus making the fuzzy game lear.
Proposed in (Dutta and Gupta, 2006; Seikh et al., 2015; Vasilevih, 2010; Vovk,
2012; Seraya and Katkova, 2012) methods are intended only for solving games in
whih fuzzy elements of payment matries have pieewise linear membership fun-
tions. In the absene of a saddle point in researh (Betor and Chandra, 2010;
Campos, 1989; Cevikel and Ahlatloglu, 2010) they adhere to the lassial sheme,
solving the game in mixed strategies, while the game with a fuzzy payment matrix is
redued to a lear game, or they use methods of fuzzy linear programming, beause
of the omplexity of whih only triangular membership funtions are onsidered. It
should be noted that the use of mixed strategies involves multiple implementation
of the game with unhanged values of the initial parameters. If the game parameters
are unlear, it means that the game parameters an be hanged, whih ontradits
the onditions for using mixed strategies. In this paper, we propose a solution to
a fuzzy antagonisti game no restritions on the type of membership funtions for
fuzzy elements of the payment matrix and without a transition to a lear statement.
2. Game Formulation
As noted above, the formulation of an antagonisti game begins with the on-
strution of sets of player strategies and a payment matrix. When building a fuzzy
payment matrix (FPM), it is neessary to determine how fuzzy numbers (FN) will
be set. First of all, it is neessary to hoose the type of membership funtion (MSF)
of a fuzzy number, beause by hoosing one or another type of MSF, we formulate
our idea of the degree of unertainty of the deision-making situation. For example,
in a fuzzy spreadsheet FuzzyCal (Chernov et al., 1998) the MSF library has the
following options, whih model dierent levels of unertainty.To prove, we alulate
the powers of fuzzy sets with redued MSF by the formula proposed by De Lua





where |W |  the power of fuzzy set and µ(x)  the membership funtion of a fuzzy
set. Power in this ase is treated as an indiator of fuzziness.
Table 1. Membership options





In the general ase, there are ample opportunities to represent the unertainty
of the values of the FPM elements. However, the onstraining fator here will be
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Fig. 1. The variants of MSF: the peak, triangle, tent, trapeze
the diulties that arise when performing the neessary transformations over the
fuzzy elements of the FPM.
Two options are possible:
1. All elements (fuzzy numbers) of FPM have the same MSF;
2. When determining the elements of the FPM an be used dierent MSF.
Choosing the same membership funtions, for example, those that orrespond
to the LR-representation of fuzzy numbers, we simplify the exeution of arithmeti
operations that may be required later. This option, in addition to this, allows to
automate the onstrution of the payment matrix, sine it is enough to hoose
a spei type from the library of standard MSF, speify a modal value and a
deviation, and further proedures an be performed without the partiipation of the
user, of ourse, with the appropriate software.The seond option is more diult
to implement, requires more omplex options for performing arithmeti operations
(alulations using α-level sets or the Zadeh generalization priniple).
The lassial sheme of the solution (nding the best strategies of the players)
of the antagonisti game is arried out in several stages:
1. Chek of possible strategies for domination;
2. Chek for saddle point;
3. Finding the best strategy.
It should be noted that at all stages need a fuzzy omparison operation, whih
has signiant features. The most simple omparison of FN is performed if their
MSF do not interset and is muh more diult when interseting (Chang, 1994,
Rao and Shankar, 2012).
124 Vladimir G. Chernov
The omparison operation an be viewed as establishing a linear order relation
between the elements of a ertain set, in our ase it is a set of fuzzy numbers. The
proposed method (Chernov, 2018) for omparing fuzzy numbers onsists in proving
the existene of a fuzzy hypothesis about the possibility of onstruting a linear
order relation of a given type of "more" or "less" for some set of fuzzy numbers.
Denition 1. The fuzzy hypothesis is formalized by two fuzzy sets dened on
the set of possible values of fuzzy numbers that make up the FPM and represent
estimates of the possibility of assigning the FPM elements to the set of minimum
or maximum values (Chernov, 2018) (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. The FPM elements to the set of minimum or maximum values
M̃ = {µmin(z), µmax(z), z ∈ [amin, amax]}
M̃ =
{
µmax(z) = (amax − z)/(amax − amin),
µmin(z) = 1− µmax(z), z ∈ [amin, amax]
}
[amin, amax]  area of denition of elements of the FPM.
Theorem 1. The problem of establishing a linear order relation on the set M is
proposed to be solved by onstruting a map of the set of fuzzy numbers on the set
M , using the intersetion operation
S̃ = µãij (x) ∩ µM̃ (x), x ∈ [amin, amax].
Chernov, 2018)
Lemma 1. The intersetion operation is most often formalized as a min operation.
S̃ = min(µãij (x), µM̃ (x)), x ∈ [amin, amax].
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Lemma 2. Alternative formalizations of the intersetion operation is the produt
(Prod) of the orresponding membership funtion
S̃ = µãij (x) ∩ µM̃ (x) = µãij (x) ∗ µM̃ (x), x ∈ [amin, amax].
and the so-alled boundary intersetion funtion
S̃ = µãij (x) ∩ µM̃ (x) = max[µãij (x) ∩ µM̃ (x) − 1.0], x ∈ [amin, amax].
It seems, that the interpretation of the intersetion operation as a produt or
boundary intersetion is more onsistent with the ontent of the problem of om-
paring fuzzy numbers.
Resulting two fuzzy sets S̃(ãij) and S̃(ãik).
In addition, for fuzzy elements need to determine the riterion for assessing the
truth of the onstruted relationship.
The membership funtions of these sets an be interpreted as the distribution
of the truth of the fuzzy hypothesis that in a pair (ãij , ãik) one of the elements will
be, for example, minimal.
Denition 2. The values αij = max[µS̃(ãij)(x)] and αik = max[µS̃(ãik)(x)] an be
onsidered as an estimate of the truth of the orresponding hypothesis.
By following the appropriate omparison proedure desribed, we an determine
the presene of a saddle point, by identifying not useful strategies to remove them
from onsideration.
The nal step is to nd the best strategies of the players. In the traditional
formulation, when the payment matrix onsists of point numbers, it is proposed to
use mixed strategies.
There are ritiisms of mixed strategies.The rst parties a zero-sum game -
it is rational ators and their hoie of strategies through the mehanism of ran-
dom seletion is hardly possible in pratie, unless, as is noted by E. S. Ventzel
(Ventzel, 2004) this is not the way to lead the enemy into onfusion, it is noted also
that the mehanism of random seletion strategies to the substane of the tasksis
not relevant. In its original version, the model of the game does not inlude the
element of hane, but its introdution and the theoretial - probable approah to
the denition of the riterion of the quality of the solution as a mathematial ex-
petation of winning, makes sense only when the individual ats of the game are
repeated many times and independently. In the ase of a single at of the game,
the probability riterion loses its meaning. It should also be noted that the multiple
implementation of a single at of the game involves the immutability of the values
of the elements of the payment matrix.
If a game with a fuzzy payment matrix is onsidered, it assumes that the values
of its elements an vary within the respetive arriers, i.e. for eah implementa-
tion of the game the onditions an hange, whih obviously ontradits the initial
prerequisites for the denition of mixed strategies. In the known variants of the
solution of the onsidered problems with fuzzy initial data, either partiular forms
of unertainty representation are onsidered, or in some way the fuzzy problem is
redued to a learstatement.
In the onditions of unertainty of the task of elements of the payment matrix,
there are enough reasons to believe that the player does not know reliably what
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strategy the enemy will hoose. Although by denition the enemy must at ratio-
nally, it is aeptable given the unertainty of his hoie, to onsider it as "nature".
Then, if we onsider the strategi game as some analogue of the game with nature,
we an reall the priniple of Bayes, aording to whih, with a known distribution
of probabilities of the states of nature, the player will have at least one pure strategy
that allows you to get the best result. In the ase of FPMs, the vagueness of its
elements is a way of formalizing unertainty.
An analogue of the Bayes priniple in relation to the game with a fuzzy payment
matrix an be formulated as follows.
Theorem 2. In a game with a given type of fuzzy values of the elements of the
payment matrix, players will have at least one pure strategy that provides the best
result.
Choose an arbitrary strategy of the rst player of the aj , while the seond player
an apply any of the strategies bk,
b1 b2 · · · · · · bm
ak m̃k1 m̃k2 · · · · · · m̃km
Theorem 3. The statement that the rst player does not know exatly the hoie of
the seond is equivalent to the statement that the seond player will apply "strategy
b1 or b2 or... ... or bm" whih an be formalized as a Union
m⋃
j=1










beause the hoie of the seond player is not known to the rst.
Proof (of Theorem 3). These proposals an be justied by analogy from the theory
of probability. If A and B are two arbitrary events that an interset and, then the
ratio is true P (A+B) = P (A)+P (B)−P (AB). If A and B are independent, then
P (AB) = P (A)P (B). Respetively,
P (A+B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A)P (B). (2)
⊓⊔
In one interpretation of the membership funtions it is onsidered as a distri-
bution of the possibilities of ourrene of some events. Then, if in the ratio (2)
probability to replae the membership funtion, we obtain one of the alternative
forms of Union
µA∪B(x) = µA(x) + µB(x) − µA(x)µB(x),
and from the ratio (2)  an alternative form of intersetion, the so-alled Prod
(Piegat, 2013)
µA∩B(x) = µA(x)µB(x).
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Denition 3. As a result, we get a fuzzy set (number) that determines the possible
results of the rst player when he hooses the strategy ak and some hoie of the
seond. If we perform transformations (1) for all strategies of the rst player, we
get a set of fuzzy sets (numbers)
R̃(A) = {R̃k : k = 1, n} = {∪mj=1µjk(x) : k = 1, n}.
In general, fuzzy sets R̃k and, aordingly, R̃(A) have membership funtions of
any kind and omparison of the orresponding fuzzy numbers in order to identify the
best strategy will be quite a diult task. Therefore, it is advisable to give the form
of fuzzy sets (membership funtions) to a single variant.As suh a transformation,
we an propose the operation FztoTriangle.
Denition 4. FztoTriangle replaes an arbitrary fuzzy set R̃k → R̃Trk with a fuzzy
set with an equivalent triangular membership funtion, in whih the left and right
boundaries, as well as the enter of gravity oinide with similar indiators of the
original membership funtion, and the maximum value of the membership funtion
should be preserved.
The FztoTrianle transformation is based on fairly simply relationship. The initial
data for onstruting an equivalen fuzzy set with a triangular membership funtion
are: the boundaries of the arrier and the oordinate of the enter of gravity of
the fuzzy set obtained as a result of transformation FztoTriangle, whih we denote
as [zmin, zmax], zCG  oordinate of the enter of gravity. Sine in this ase the
maximum value of the membership funtion of the equivalent fuzzy set should be
1, then the triangular membership funtion is uniquely determined by the triple
[zL = zmin, z
∗, zR = zmax], where z
∗
is the unknown oordinate of the maximum of
the membership funtion.
Denition 5. The value of z∗ an be determined on the basis of the known rela-
tion for determining the oordinates of the enter of gravity of a triangle with the






∗ + zR). (3)
When alulating aording to relation (3) for some values of zL, zCG, zR the
value z∗ > zR an be obtained, whih is impossible aordingto the onditions for
determining the membership funtion. Therefore, when alulating the z∗ value, it
is neessary to introdue the orresponding restrition. Then
z∗ =
{
3zCG − zL − zR, z∗ < zR




Another situation is also possible, when alulating by the ratio (3) for some om-
bination of values zL, zCG, zR, it will be obtained that z
∗ < zL, whih is also
impossible under the onditions of onstruting membership funtions. In this ase
the following restrition must be applied
z∗ =
{
3zCG − zL − zR, z∗ > zL
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We an show that this transformation does not hange the logi of the game. To
ompare fuzzy numbers, point estimates an be used (Yager, 1977), the values of
whih depend on the position of the number on the numerial axis. The more to the
right a fuzzy number is loated, the greater its point estimate. The FztoTriangle
transformation preserves the relative position of fuzzy numbers representing an
estimate of the result of hoosing a partiular strategy. Aordingly, for equivalent
fuzzy numbers obtained after the FztoTriangle transformation, the ratio between
the point estimates will remain unhanged.
Denition 6. The possible result of the rst player using some strategy ak, if the
hoie of the seond is not known, an be represented by the equivalent fuzzy set
R̃Trk . Similarly, any strategy of the seond player bl an be mathed by a fuzzy





































Denition 7. The rst player as the best will hoose the strategy ak → maxkR̃Trk ,
k = 1, n, and the seond  bl → minlH̃Trl , l = 1,m.
The best strategy an be determined either using point estimates or a method
based on the fuzzy preferene hypothesis. Mark, that both methods give unambigu-
ousand oiniding results, but the point estimation method is more umbersome in
omputational terms.
Denition 8. The equilibrium result is dened as the intersetion
γ̃ = minH̃Trl ∩maxR̃Trk .
These proposals an be justied again by analogy from probability theory, based
on the ratio (2).
As you know, in the lassi prodution of the game, the top prie of the game is
determined as the best guaranteed result of the rst player. In the fuzzy formulation
of the guaranteed result annot speak, but you an enter a dierent interpretation
of the top prie of the game. This is the result of the rst player, if he will at in the
best way, and the seond player will at unsuessfully, i.e. for some reason hoose
the worst strategy.
Denition 9. Let's denote the best result of the rst player as maxR̃Trk , and the
worst result of the seond maxH̃Trq , then the fuzzy top prie of the game
β̃ = maxH̃Trq ∩maxR̃Trk , k = 1, n, q = 1,m.
Denition 10. The fuzzy lower prie of the game is determined based on their
assump-tion that the seond player, who is supposed to usually lose, hooses the best
strategy bl → minlH̃Trq , and the rst  the worst strategy for him ap → minpR̃Trp .
Then
α̃ = minH̃Trl ∩minR̃Trp .
It an be proved by using the omparison proedures desribed above that the
ratio is true α̃ ≤ γ̃ ≤ β̃.
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3. Numerial Example
Consider a game with fuzzy payment matries, the values of their elements were
hosen arbitrarily from various soures, various options for membership funtions
are used, whih were also hosen arbitrarily without any additional onsiderations.
Table 2. The fuzzy payment matries
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 1̃0.6 (peak) 1̃5.6 (trapeze) 1̃5.6 (triangle) 9̃.6 (tent)
a2 1̃5.6 (tent) 1̃4.6 (trapeze) 0̃.6 (peak) 1̃5.6 (trapeze)
a3 1̃3.6 (trapeze) 9̃.6 (peak) 8̃.6 (tent) 0̃.6 (trapeze)
a4 1̃4.6 (triangle) 9̃.6 (peak) 1̃0.6 (peak) 1̃3.6 (triangle)
In table 3 a1, . . . , a4  strategies of the rst player; b1, . . . , b4  strategies of
the seond player; elements of the payment matrix are fuzzy numbers, as indiated
by the sign "wave" above the orresponding number, with symmetri membership
funtions, the type of whih is indiated in brakets in the table ells; numeri
values speied in the table ells under the sign "wave" are modal values of the
orresponding fuzzy numbers.
For all alulations, a fuzzy table FuzzyCal was used. A saddle point hek
showed its absene, a dominane hek determined that the strategy a3 is not useful
and is exluded from onsideration.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the membership funtions of fuzzy estimates (num-
bers) of the onsequenes of the rst player's hoie of strategy a1 (Fig. 3) and
the seond player - strategies b3 (Fig. 4) and the results of applying the FztoTri-
angle transformation to these estimates. In both gures, ombinations of elements
orresponding to line a1 (Fig. 3) and olumn b3 (Fig. 4) of table 3 are shown in
brakets.
Based on theorem 3, as a result of applying the FztoTriangle transformation
to the lines (strategies of the rst player) of table 3, equivalent fuzzy sets with
triangular membership funtions with parameters will be onstruted:
for stratgy a1  zL = 9.3, z
∗ = 14.66, zCG = 13.63, zR = 16.5;
a2  zL = 0, z
∗ = 16.5, zCG = 12.74, zR = 16.5;
a3  zL = 9.3, z
∗ = 14.07, zCG = 13.06, zR = 16.5.
Using the method of omparing fuzzy numbers proposed in (Chernov, 2018), we
get that for the rst player, the most preferred strategy is a1, as a result of whih
the rst player an expet the best result.
Similarly for the seond player for strategies:
b1  zL = 10.2, z
∗ = 14.53, zCG = 13.58, zR = 15.4;
b2  zL = 9.3, z
∗ = 16.5, zCG = 14.58, zR = 16.5;
b3  zL = 0, z
∗ = 13.02, zCG = 10.06, zR = 16.5;
b4  zL = 9.3, z
∗ = 15.63, zCG = 14.02, zR = 16.5
aordingly, the best strategy of the seond player will be b3, as a result of whih
he an expet to lose the least.
For the speied payment matrix α̃ = 1̃0.85 < γ̃ = 1̃3.42 < β̃ = 1̃3.86.
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Fig. 3. Membership funtion for strategy a1 rst player after onversion FztoTriangle
Fig. 4. Membership funtion for strategy b3 seond player after onversion FztoTriangle
4. Conlusion
The question arises, how to interpret the result. The value of the entroid or
modal value obtained as a result of transformations should not be regarded as a
result that will neessarily be obtained. It an be obtained from the set of results
determined by the fuzzy payment matrix, when applying the best strategy and some
ations of the enemy, if the latter is within the framework of useful strategies.
The proposed method of solving the game with FPM allows you to nd the best
strategies of players without going to a lear interpretation of the game.
Referenes
Betor, C. R. and S. Chandra (2010). Fuzzy Mathematial Programming and Fuzzy Matrix
Games. Springer.
Campos, L. (1989). Fuzzy linear programming model to solve fuzzy matrix games. Fuzzy
Sets and Systems, 32(3), 275289.
Cevikel, A.C. and M. Ahlatloglu (2010). Solution for fuzzy matrix games. Computer and
Mathematis with Appliations, 60, 399410.
Chaker, A., A. C. Dariani and C. Luas (2008). How an fuzzy logi determine game equi-
libriums better. Intelligent Systems (IS'08), 4-th International IEEE Conferene, 1,
2-512-56.
Chang, P.-T. (1994). Ranking of Fuzzy Sets Based on the Conept of Existene. Computers
and mathematis with appliations, 27, 121.
Chernov, V.G., I.A. Andreev, D.A. Gradusov and D.V. Tretyakov (1998). The solution
of business problems by means of fuzzy algebra. Torah-Center: Mosow (in Russian).
Games With Fuzzy Payment Matrix 131
Chernov, V.G. (2018). Comparison of fuzzy numbers based on the onstrution of a lin-
ear relationship of order. Dynamis of omplex systems  XXI entury, 2, 8187 (in
Russian).
Dubois, D. and H. Prade (1980). Theorie des Possibilites. Appliations a la representation
des onisisanesen in for natique. Masson.
Dutta, B. and S. Gupta (2006). On Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games
with trapezoidal fuzzy payos. Fuzzy Information and Engineering, 6(3), 299314.
Falomkina, O.V. (2009). Statistial fuzzy games. MGU: Mosow. (in Russian)
Higast, M. and G. J. Klir (1983). Measures of unertainty and information based of possi-
bility distribution. Int. J. General Systems, 9(1), 4358.
Orlovsky, S.A. (1976). Games in a fuzzy environment. Journal of Computational Mathe-
matis and Mathematial Physis, 6(16), 14271435 (in Russian).
Piegat, A. (2013). Fuzzy modeling and ontrol. Physia: Verlog.
Qiu, D. Y. Xing and S. Chen (2018). Solving fuzzy matrix games through a ranking value
funtion method. J. Math. Computer Si., 18, 175183.
Rao, P. P. B. and N.R. Shankar (2012). Ranking generalized fuzzy numbers using area,
mode, spread and weight. International Journal of Applied Siene and Engineering,
10(1), 4157.
Sahoo, L. (2015). Eet of defuzziation methods in solving fuzzy matrix games. Journal
of New Theory, 8, 5164.
Sahoo, L. (2017). An approah for solving fuzzy matrix games using signed distane method.
UK Journal of Information and Computing Siene, 12(1), 7380.
Seagal, A.V. (2011). Game-theoreti model of investment deision making. Sienti notes
of the Taurida National University named after V. I. Vernadsky, a series of "Eonomis
and Management", 1(63), 193205.
Seikh, M. R. , P.K. Nayak, and M. Pal (2015). An alternative approah for solving fuzzy
matrix games. International Journal of Mathematis and Soft Computing, 5(1), 7992.
Seraya, O.V. and T.N. Katkova (2012). The task of the theory of games with a fuzzy
payment matrix. Mathematial Mahines and Systems, 3, 2936.
Stalin, T. and M. Thiruheran (2015). Solving Fuzzy Matrix Games Defuzziated by
Trapezoidal Paraboli Fuzzy Numbers. International Journal for Sienti Researh and
Development, 3(10), 10061010.
Vasilevih, L. F. (2010). Solution of fuzzy matrix games. zavantag.om
/dos/2010/index21314.html
Ventzel, E. S. (2004). Operations researh. Tasks, priniples, methodology. Drofa: Moskow
(in Russian).
Vovk, S. P. (2012). A game of two persons with fuzzy strategies and preferenes. Almana
of modern siene and eduation, 7(85), 479485 (in Russian).
Yager, R.R. (1977). Multi-objetive deision-making using a fuzzy sets. Intern. J. Man-
Mahine Studies, 9(4), 375382.
Zaihenko, Yu.P. (2010). Game models of deision making in onditions of unertainty.
In: Proeedings of the V international seminar shool "Theory of deision-making".
Uzhgorod (in Ukrainian).
